Bringing science to market: Commercializing from NIH SBIR awards. by Link, Albert N. et al.
Bringing science to market: Commercializing from NIH SBIR awards. 
By: Albert N. Link and Christopher J. Ruhm 
Link, A. N., & Ruhm, C. J. (November 23, 2009). Bringing science to market: Commercializing 
from NIH SBIR awards. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 18, 4, 381-402. 
This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an article whose final and definitive form, the 
Version of Record, has been published in Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 
2009 [copyright Taylor & Francis], available online at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10438590802208166.  
Abstract: 
We offer empirical information on the correlates of commercialization activity for research 
projects funded through the US National Institutes of Health's (NIH's) Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) award program. Based on this analysis we suggest possible recommendations 
for improving this aspect of the performance of NIH's SBIR program. Specifically, we estimate a 
model of the probability of commercialization as a function of the project's ability to attract 
additional developmental funding, along with other control variables. We find that additional 
developmental funding from non-SBIR federal sources and from own internal sources are 
important predictors of commercialization success, relatively more so than additional 
developmental funding from venture capitalists. We also find, among other things, that 
university involvement in the underlying research increases the probability of commercialization. 
Thus, these factors should be considered by NIH when making awards, if increased 
commercialization is an objective. 
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1. Introduction 
In light of the productivity slowdown in the United States in the late-1970s and early-1980s, a 
number of public policy responses were initiated to enhance the rate of US innovation through 
increases in research and development (R&D) and related activities.1 The Bayh–Dole Act was 
passed in 1980, the R&E Tax Credit was enacted in 1981, the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program was created in 1982, and the National Cooperative Research Act was 
legislated in 1984. The broad purpose of these policy responses was to renew technological 
growth throughout the nation.2 
This paper focuses specifically on the management of the SBIR program, and it offers 
information relevant to the assessment of the program's objective of stimulating the private 
sector's commercialization of the innovations resulting from the use of public resources. Based 
on that information, the paper also suggests possible policy recommendations to improve 
funding performance. We certainly do not claim that the SBIR program was the most significant 
of the post-productivity slowdown policy initiatives. However, our focus on it is particularly 
fruitful because of the availability of unique and rich data – recently collected by the National 
Research Council (NRC) within the National Academies as part of an overall evaluation of the 
SBIR program – related to SBIR projects funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and 
because the SBIR program has yet to be analyzed statistically relative to its stated objectives.3 
Statistical analysis of commercialization is important at two levels. Broadly, it is a dimension of 
public accountability (Link and Scott 1998), as stated in a recent NRC report: ‘Commercializing 
SBIR-supported innovation is necessary if the nation is to capitalize on its SBIR investments’ 
(National Research Council 2007, 5). And, at a narrower level, an assessment offers the potential 
for policy recommendations to improve the management of the SBIR program. 
Commercialization of SBIR projects funded by the NIH is of particular interest for several 
reasons. First, as detailed below, the Department of Health and Human Services (2003) is the 
largest funder of non-defense related SBIR projects and most of these are through the NIH. 
Second, commercialized technologies that result in improvements in health are particularly likely 
to have high rates of return (social and private). For instance, recent research (e.g., Murphy and 
Topel 2006; Hall and Jones 2007) documents both the large net benefit of previous health 
spending, as well as the desirability of even higher expenditure shares in the future. 
This paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we overview the history of the SBIR program 
with an emphasis on current funding activities. Section 3 describes the NIH SBIR data set 
analyzed, and therein we posit the empirical framework used for estimating the probability that 
an SBIR-funded project will be commercialized. Section 4 presents our econometric findings. 
Section 5 discusses endogeneity issues related to our econometric analysis, and Section 6 offers 
tentative policy recommendations subject to the limitations of our analysis. 
2. Overview of the SBIR program 
The SBIR program is a public/private partnership that provides grants to fund private R&D 
projects. It aims to help fulfill the government's mission to enhance private-sector R&D and to 
complement the results of federal research.4 A prototype of the SBIR program began at the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1977 (Tibbetts 1999). At that time, the goal of the 
program was to encourage small businesses – increasingly recognized to be a source of 
innovation and employment in the US economy – to participate in NSF-sponsored research, 
especially research with commercial potential. Because of the early success of the program at 
NSF, Congress passed the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-219; 
hereafter, the 1982 Act). 
The 1982 Act required all government departments and agencies with external research programs 
of greater than $100 million to establish their own SBIR program and to set aside funds equal to 
0.20% of the external research budget.5 In 1983, this amount totalled $45 million. 
The objectives of the program as stated by the 1982 Act are as follows: 
1 Simulating technological innovation. 
2 Using small business to meet Federal research and development needs. 
3 Fostering and encouraging participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in 
technological innovation. 
4 Increasing private sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal research and 
development. 
As part of the 1982 Act, SBIR program awards were structured as defined by three phases 
(National Research Council 2004; Wessner 2007).6 Phase I awards are small, generally less than 
$100,000 for the six month award period. The purpose of Phase I awards is to assist businesses 
as they assess the feasibility of an idea's scientific and commercial potential in response to the 
funding agency's objectives.7 Phase II awards typically range up to $750,000 over two years.8 
These awards are for the business to develop further its proposed research, ideally leading to a 
commercializable product, process, or service.9 The Phase II awards of public funds for 
development are sometimes augmented by outside private funding (Wessner 2000). Further work 
on the projects launched through the SBIR program occurs in what is called Phase III, which 
does not involve SBIR funds.10 At this stage businesses needing additional financing—to ensure 
that the product, process, or service can move into the marketplace—are expected to obtain it 
from sources other than the SBIR program. 
In 1992, the SBIR program was reauthorized until 2000 through the Small Business Research 
and Development Enactment Act (P.L. 102-564). Under the 1982 Act, the set aside had increased 
to 1.25%; the 1992 reauthorization raised that amount over time to 2.50% and re-emphasized the 
commercialization intent of SBIR-funded technologies (see point (4) of the 1982 Act above).11 
The 1992 reauthorization broadened objective (3) above to also focus on women: ‘to provide for 
enhanced outreach efforts to increase the participation of … small businesses that are 51 percent 
owned and controlled by women.’ The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-
554) extended the SBIR program until 2008 and kept the 2.50% set aside.12 
Eleven agencies currently participate in the SBIR program: the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (DoC), 
Defense (DoD), Education (ED), Energy (DoE), Health and Human Services (HHS, particularly 
the NIH), Transportation (DoT), and, most recently, Homeland Security (DHS). In 2005, DoD 
maintained the largest program, awarding about 51% of total dollars and funding about 57% of 
total awards in that year. Five agencies—DoD, HHS, NASA, DoE, and NSF—account for nearly 
97% of the program's expenditures, with HHS (which includes the NIH) being the second most 
important, accounting for 30% of awards and 19% of total dollars in 2005 (Table 1). 
Table 1. SBIR awards and dollars, FY2005. 
Agency 
Phase I 
awards 
Phase I 
dollars 
Phase II 
awards 
Phase II 
dollars 
Total 
awards Total dollars 
DoD 2344 $213,482,152 998 $729,285,508 3342 $942,767,660 
HHS 732 $149,584,038 369 $412,504.975 1101 $562,089,013 
DoE 259 $25,757,637 101 $77,852,565 360 $103,610,202 
NASA 290 $20,183,648 139 $83,014,853 429 $103,198,501 
NSF 152 $15,054,750 132 $64,101,179 284 $79,155,929 
USDA 91 $7,195,211 40 $11,738,536 131 $18,933,747 
DHS 62 $6,158,240 13 $10,241,202 75 $16,399,442 
ED 22 $1,646,603 14 $6,749,980 36 $8,396,583 
DoC 34 $2,373,433 19 $5,469,846 53 $7,843,279 
EPA 38 $2,652,216 14 $3,540,251 52 $6,192,467 
DoT 7 $679,154 3 $1,765,468 10 $2,444,622 
Total 4031 $444,767,082 1842 $1,406,264,363 5873 $1,851,031,445 
Source: US Small Business Administration (2006) (http://tech-net.sba.gov/). 
 
3. The NRC data set and the statistical framework 
The NRC data set on NIH SBIR awards was constructed for the broader purpose of conducting a 
cross-agency evaluation of the SBIR program, as requested by Congress as part of the Small 
Business Reauthorization Act of 2000.13 This is the data set analyzed herein.14 
Between 1992 and 2001 – the time period covered in the NRC data set – 2,497 Phase II SBIR 
project awards were made by NIH. Of these, 1672 were randomly selected by the NRC (for 
budgetary reasons) to receive an in-depth survey related to outputs associated with the project, 
representing a random sampling proportion of 67.0% The NCR's random sample was chosen to 
ensure balanced coverage by year and by number of Phase II awards received each year between 
1992 and 2001. From the 1672 random projects, 488 completed or partially completed surveys 
were returned to the NRC. Phase II research was not yet finished in 34 of the projects with 
completed surveys, five projects were excluded because they were funded by Institutes with 
fewer than five completed surveys, and another 44 did not provide all of the information needed 
for our analysis (discussed below).15 The final sample of projects analyzed is 405 (Table 2). 
Table 2. Final sample of NIH phase II projects awarded between 1992 and 2001. 
Data reduction       Number of projects 
Population of NIH Projects     2497 
Survey population      1680 
Random survey population     1672 
Survey respondents      488 
Respondents with completed Phase II projects  454 
Responses from institutes with ≥5 survey responses  449 
Survey respondents reporting all relevant information 405 
 
The project output focused on in this study is a dichotomous variable taking the value of one 
(zero) for completed Phase II projects that had (had not) resulted in commercialized products, 
processes, services or other sales such as rights to technology or licensing revenues by 2005, the 
year that the NRC survey was administered. As shown in Table 3, the mean value of this 
dichotomous variable Commercial is.5111. In other words, the chance of a Phase II NIH SBIR 
award being successful, as measured in terms of it resulting in a commercialized technology, was 
just over 50% or just better than the odds associated with the flip of a fair coin.16 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the final sample (n=405). 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Commercial 0.511 0.501 0 1 
AddFund 0.585 0.493 0 1 
AddFund-Fed 0.064 0.245 0 1 
AddFund-VC 0.035 0.183 0 1 
AddFund-Oth 0.158 0.365 0 1 
AddFund-SLU 0.057 0.232 0 1 
AddFund-Own 0.504 0.501 0 1 
AddFund $1,203,383 $6,781,290 0 8.15e+07 
$AddFund-Fed $111,271 $1,325,214 0 2.60e+07 
$AddFund-VC $379,301 $4,021,767 0 5.99e+07 
$AddFund-Oth $488,872 $3,702,643 0 5.50e+07 
$AddFund-SLU $15,028 $126,162 0 1650000 
$AddFund-Own $208,911 $93,3430 0 1.28e+07 
KnowlBase 1.08 3.33 0 28 
Female 0.175 0.381 0 1 
Minority 0.049 0.217 0 1 
Univ 0.533 0.500 0 1 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the final sample (n=405). 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
AA 0.017 0.131 0 1 
AG 0.086 0.281 0 1 
AI 0.111 0.315 0 1 
AR 0.012 0.111 0 1 
CA 0.128 0.335 0 1 
DA 0.057 0.232 0 1 
DC 0.040 0.195 0 1 
DK 0.044 0.206 0 1 
ES 0.025 0.155 0 1 
EY 0.017 0.131 0 1 
GM 0.074 0.262 0 1 
HD 0.057 0.232 0 1 
HG 0.015 0.121 0 1 
HL 0.126 0.332 0 1 
MH 0.059 0.236 0 1 
NR 0.005 0.070 0 1 
NS 0.069 0.254 0 1 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the final sample (n=405). 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
RR 0.052 0.222 0 1 
Age 7.37 2.65 4 13 
Note: AA = National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), AG = National Institute on Aging (NIA), AI = 
National Institute on Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), AR = National Institute on Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and 
Skin Disease (NIAMS), CA = National Cancer Institute (NCI), DA = National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), DC = National 
Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders (NIDCD), DK = National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and 
Kidney Diseases (NIDDK), ES = National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), EY = National Eye Institute 
(NEI), GM = National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS), HD = National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development (NICHD), HG = National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), HL = National Heart, Lung and Blood 
Institute (NHLBI), MH = National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), NR = National Institute of Nursing Research (NINR), NS 
= National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS), and RR = National Center for Research Resources (NCRR). 
 
There is a conspicuous void of systematic information in the academic literature on factors 
associated with the success of small entrepreneurial firms (Åstebro 1998). The data that do exist 
are limited in scope, and they relate in general to the longevity and commercial success of R&D-
based technologies in larger, well-established organizations.17 Thus, our hypotheses below 
follow from both a selected theoretical literature and related and generalizable empirical studies. 
We posit a positive correlation between commercialization and the presence of additional 
development funding for the award project. We believe that small entrepreneurial businesses 
face what Zeira (1987) called ‘structural uncertainty’ (204). Specifically, such businesses do not 
know a priori if their SBIR technology is commercializable, and if it is, what its commercial 
potential might be.18 Zeira argued, but not in the context of SBIR, that under structural 
uncertainty relevant information could be acquired through technological research. Thus, to the 
extent that the presence of additional development funding reflects the ability of a business to 
conduct more research on its SBIR project, then that project, ceteris paribus, should have a 
greater probability of commercialization – this, of course, is the objective of Phase III. 
Relatedly, Åstebro (2003) argued that independent inventors, who might be similar to the 
entrepreneurs in the businesses that receive NIH SBIR awards, inherently face problems 
attracting external financing due to ‘information asymmetries, moral hazard and coordination 
problems’ (237).19 Private investors (e.g., venture capitalists, foreign investors) incur significant 
costs acquiring information about new technologies. When they do invest in a potential 
technology, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that at least two hurdles have been cleared. 
One hurdle is that the business receiving the venture capital was selected among all businesses to 
be scrutinized, and the other hurdle is that the specific business was then selected among all that 
were scrutinized. This suggests, ceteris paribus, that the probability of commercialization should 
be greater for NIH SBIR projects for which there is additional developmental funding from 
private investors. 
Thus, our empirical model is 
 
where, commercialization is measured by the dichotomous variable Commercial, and where the 
variable AddFund represents additional developmental funding received by the business in 
support of the technology developed during its Phase II project. AddFund equals 1 if any 
additional developmental funding was received to support the project at some point in time, and 
0 otherwise. Just under 59% of the projects in the sample received additional developmental 
funding (Table 3). 
In some specifications of Equation (1) we disaggregate additional developmental funding into 
five non-mutually exclusive dichotomous categories. AddFund-Fed equals 1 if the project 
received additional non-SBIR funds from federal sources, and 0 otherwise; AddFund-VC equals 
1 for US venture capital funds, and 0 otherwise; AddFund-Oth equals 1 for other private 
investment funds (e.g., foreign investment, other private equity, or other domestic private 
company), and 0 otherwise; AddFund-SLU equals 1 for state or local government or university 
funds, and 0 otherwise; and AddFund-Own equals 1 for personal and/or internal business funds, 
and 0 otherwise. Table 3 also shows mean amounts of external funding from each of these 
sources, denoted with a $ in front of the specified variable (e.g. $AddFund-Fed indicates that $ 
amount of non-SBIR federal funds received). 
Five control variables are subsumed in vector X. The first represents the knowledge base, or 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1989), of the business with respect to the technology 
being researched during the Phase II project. KnowlBase is the number of previous Phase II 
awards the business has previously received that are related to the project supported by the 
current Phase II award.20 Nearly 38% of the projects in our sample are related to previous Phase 
II awards (not shown in Table 3). To the extent there is learning-by-doing, in the sense of Arrow 
(1962), and/or economies of scope in research from an expanded knowledge base, and to the 
extent that this enriched knowledge base leads to subsequent research success, we posit a 
positive correlation between KnowlBase and the probability of commercialization, ceteris 
paribus.21 The distribution of previous related Phase II SBIR awards is skewed. Nearly 38% of 
the projects in our sample are related to previous Phase II awards (not shown in Table 3) but only 
17% are in businesses with more than one previous related award while 5% are in businesses 
having previously received five or more Phase II awards. 
The second control variable represents the ownership of the business being 51% owned and 
controlled by a female. Female equals 1 for such a business, and 0 otherwise. Nearly 18% of the 
Phase II projects in the sample were awarded to female owned and controlled businesses(Table 
3). We do not posit the direction of the correlation between Female and the probability of 
commercialization, but rather offer alternative interpretations of an observed correlation. If 
female owned and controlled businesses were discriminated against from receiving SBIR awards 
prior to the 1992 reauthorization, removing that bias should imply that such businesses would 
now be equally as successful as other businesses, thus there should not be any statistical 
correlation between Female and the probability of commercialization. If female owned and 
controlled businesses were less qualified, on average, to receive SBIR awards, and 
reauthorization was interpreted as a mandate for agencies to now fund more of these projects, 
there should be a negative correlation between Female and the probability of commercialization. 
Conversely, if female owned and controlled businesses were more qualified to receive NIH SBIR 
awards but were not being objectively evaluated prior to the reauthorization, there should be a 
positive correlation between Female and the probability of commercialization. 
The third control variable represents the ownership of the business being 51% minority owned 
and controlled. Minority equals 1 for such a business, and 0 otherwise. As shown in Table 3, 
nearly 5% of the Phase II projects in the sample were awarded to minority owned and controlled 
businesses.22 Although the 1992 reauthorization did not explicitly focus on increasing minority 
participation, it was nevertheless a stated objective of the 1982 Act. We anticipate that the 
interpretation of the direction of correlation between Minority and the probability of 
commercialization will be similar to that for Female. 
The fourth control variable quantifies if a university was involved with the SBIR project research 
(Univ =1) , or not Univ = 0).23 Hall, Link, and Scott (2003) argued that universities are invited 
to partner with small entrepreneurial research joint ventures to provide insights into future 
research problems. University faculty thus act as ombudsman to oversee the research and help to 
ensure the project's success. Relatedly Zucker Darby, and Armstrong (1998), Zucker, Darby, and 
Brewer (1998) and Zucker and Darby (2001) found that when star scientists were involved with 
small biotechnology enterprises, patenting, product innovations, and the introduction of new 
products increased. Thus, to the extent that university involvement, albeit broadly defined by the 
variable Univ, helps to ensure the success of research projects, we posit a positive correlation 
with it and the probability of commercialization.24 Universities were involved in 53% of the 
sample projects (Table 3). 
And finally, we control for the attributes of the research associated with the Phase II award 
through a set of binary variables representing the Institute within the NIH that funded each 
project (defined in the note within Table 3 and recall that five projects were deleted from the 
sample because they were funded by Institutes with fewer than five completed surveys).25 We 
have no prior expectation about the correlations between the probability of commercialization 
and any particular Institute. 
A potential empirical concern is selection bias resulting from the relatively low rate (29.2%) at 
which businesses returned the SBIR project surveys. We examined this possibility by estimating 
Equation (1), by maximum likelihood, as a bivariate probit model with selection, simultaneously 
with a model of the probability of response to the project survey specified by: 
 
where Age measures the number of years since the Phase II award, defined as the year of the 
survey (2005) less the year of the Phase II award (between 1992 and 2001).26 Our key 
identification strategy in the selection model is that Age is included in the response equation but 
excluded from the commercialization model. If a strong theoretical foundation for why some 
businesses would respond to the survey for a particular project is absent, we posit that the older 
the Phase II award, the less institutional knowledge there is that still exists within the business 
for such a project and thus the less likely the business would respond to the survey. Thus, there 
should be a negative correlation between Age and the probability of response. This is confirmed 
by our econometric estimates.27 
Conversely, Age is not included in the probability of commercialization model: Equation (1). 
One might reason that the probability of commercialization would increase over time as the 
business was first able to complete its Phase II award project and then seek and receive Phase III 
funding. However, the data do not support this. In fact, the age distributions of commercialized 
and non-commercialized projects are virtually identical, and the coefficient on Age is small and 
insignificant when entered as an additional covariate in Equation (1).28 A reasonable 
interpretation of these findings is that, if commercialization is going to occur, it will take place 
close to the date that the Phase II award project is completed. 
The bivariate probit estimates provided no indication of selection bias. Specifically, the estimates 
always fail to reject the null hypothesis that the models of response and commercialization are 
independent of one another (the correlation of the errors in the two models is not significantly 
different from zero) and the parameter estimates of interest are always very close to those 
obtained without accounting for selection.29 For this reason, the results reported below are for 
single equation models that do not account for selection. 
Table 4 provides sample average values of selected variables for commercialized and 
noncommercialized projects. The last column of the table shows p-values for the null hypothesis 
that the sample means are the same for the two groups. The most important findings are that 
commercialized projects are significantly more likely than non-commercialized projects to have 
received additional developmental funding (74% versus 42%), particularly non-SBIR funds from 
federal sources (9.2% versus 3.5%) and from personal or internal funds (63% versus 37%). They 
are also more than twice as likely to receive venture capital funds but, because this occurs 
infrequently (4.8% versus 2.0%), the difference is not significant at the.10 level. Projects are also 
significantly (at the.10 level) more likely to be commercialized when awarded to businesses with 
a more extensive knowledge base (1.4 versus 0.8 previous related SBIR projects) and to those 
owned by minorities (6.8% versus 3.0%). There are no significant differences by other sources of 
external funding, female ownership, university involvement or years since the Phase II award. 
Finally, projects funded by the National Institutes on Drug Abuse and Mental Health are 
significantly more likely than others to commercialize while those supported by the National 
Institutes on Aging, Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin 
Disease, National Eye Institute and National Heart Lung and Blood Institute are relatively less 
likely to do so (not shown in Table 4).30 
Table 4. Selected sample means by commercialization status. 
Variable Not commercialized (n=198) Commercialized (n=207) P-value of difference 
AddFund 0.424 0.739 <0.001 
AddFund-Fed 0.035 0.092 0.021 
AddFund-VC 0.020 0.048 0.122 
AddFund-Oth 0.131 0.184 0.150 
AddFund-SLU 0.051 0.063 0.594 
AddFund-Own 0.369 0.633 <0.001 
KnowlBase 0.783 1.367 0.078 
Female 0.152 0.198 0.219 
Minority 0.030 0.068 0.083 
Univ 0.505 0.560 0.266 
Age 7.394 7.348 0.861 
Note: Sample means are shown separately for commercialized and non-commercialized projects. The last column shows the P-
value for the null hypothesis that the sample means are the same for the two groups. 
 
Despite large absolute differences in the magnitudes, none of the variables showing dollar 
amounts of external funding differ significantly with commercialization status (not shown in 
Table 4).31 Consider venture capital funding, which provides the most extreme example. The 
mean commercialized project received almost $689,000 of venture capital compared with less 
than $56,000 for non-commercialized projects, yet this difference is not significant at the 0.10 
level. The reason is that the receipt of this funding is extremely skewed, with a small number of 
projects receiving virtually all of the funds. For instance, in our sample, just 10 commercialized 
projects obtained venture capital, with over 90% of all such funds received by just three 
projects.32 One implication is that it will be quite difficult to model econometrically how the 
amount of external funding influences commercialization probabilities, and that efforts to do so 
will need to account for the skewness in the distribution.33 
Table 5 provides additional information on the frequency and distribution of external funding. 
Over one-third (36%) of projects receiving additional funding obtain it from two or more 
sources, with funding from own company or personal sources being by far the most common, as 
well as most frequently being the exclusive source of additional funding. Indeed, funds are rarely 
received from most other sources unless some own company or personal funding is also 
provided. 
Table 5. Sources and frequency of additional project funding. 
    Funding received Projects receiving funding from: 
  
All 
projects 
All 
sources 
Exclusive funding 
source 
Add 
Fund-Fed 
Add 
Fund-VC 
Add 
Fund-Oth 
Add 
Fund-
SLU 
Add 
Fund-
Own 
Funding source 
AddFund-
Fed 
0.064 0.114 0.017 1.000 0.143 0.109 0.304 0.078 
AddFund-
VC 
0.035 0.061 0.000 0.077 1.000 0.156 0.043 0.034 
AddFund-
Oth 
0.158 0.279 0.039 0.269 0.714 1.000 0.391 0.221 
AddFund-
SLU 
0.057 0.100 0.000 0.269 0.072 0.140 1.000 0.103 
Table 5. Sources and frequency of additional project funding. 
    Funding received Projects receiving funding from: 
  
All 
projects 
All 
sources 
Exclusive funding 
source 
Add 
Fund-Fed 
Add 
Fund-VC 
Add 
Fund-Oth 
Add 
Fund-
SLU 
Add 
Fund-
Own 
AddFund-
Own 
0.504 0.890 0.585 0.615 0.500 0.703 0.913 1.000 
Not 
identified 
0.020 0.034             
# Identified funding sources 
1 0.363 0.642   0.154 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.657 
2 0.161 0.284   0.539 0.643 0.656 0.478 0.265 
3 0.035 0.061   0.231 0.286 0.156 0.391 0.064 
4 0.007 0.013   0.077 0.071 0.047 0.130 0.015 
Sample 
size 
405 237 237 26 14 64 23 204 
Note: Proportion of projects receiving specified types of additional funding and the number of additional funding sources are 
shown. The sample in the third and fourth column is restricted to projects receiving some additional funding. Those in the fifth 
through ninth columns are restricted to projects receiving specified sources of outside funding. The ‘not identified’ category 
refers to projects receiving additional funding but without information provided on its source. 
4. Econometric results 
The probability of commercialization models are summarized in Table 6. Because probit 
coefficients can be somewhat difficult to interpret, we report marginal effects for the continuous 
regressors and predicted effects of changing dichotomous variables from zero to a one, with the 
other covariates evaluated at the sample means. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. We account for the possibility of diminishing returns to the effect of the knowledge 
base of the business from previous related Phase II projects on commercialization by controlling 
for the natural log, rather than level, of related Phase II projects.34 
Table 6. Estimated marginal effects of the probability of commercialization (robust standard 
errors in parentheses). 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AddFund 0.3475* (0.0515) — — — 
AddFund-Fed — 0.2873** (0.0947) — — 
AddFund-VC — 0.2626** (0.1093) — — 
AddFund-Oth — 0.0028 (0.0813) — — 
AddFund-SLU — −0.1020 (0.1360) — — 
AddFund-Own — 0.2787* (0.0535) — — 
ln$AddFund — — 0.0276* (0.0045) — 
ln$AddFund-Fed — — — 0.0210** (0.0098) 
ln$AddFund-VC — — — 0.0176 ***(0.0105) 
ln$AddFund-Oth — — — 0.0007 (0.0063) 
ln$AddFund-SLU — — — −0.0084 (0.0118) 
ln$AddFund-Own — — — 0.0264* (0.0049) 
lnKnowlBase 0.1413* (0.0445) 0.1310* (0.0443) 0.1341* (0.0444) 0.1318* (0.0445) 
Female −0.0083 (0.0747) −.0007 (0.0753) 0.0064 (0.0744) 0.0009 (0.0749) 
Minority 0.0819 (0.1315) 0.0949 (0.1267) 0.1004 (0.1306) 0.1151 (0.1269) 
Univ 0.1190** (0.0553) 0.1223** (0.0550) 0.1195** (0.0552) 0.1333** (0.0556) 
Table 6. Estimated marginal effects of the probability of commercialization (robust standard 
errors in parentheses). 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AA −0.0247 (0.3564) 0.0053 (0.3676) −0.0265 (0.3613) 0.0066 (0.3656) 
AG 0.2440 (0.2648) −0.2459 (0.2759) −0.2444 (0.2736) −0.2521 (0.2735) 
AI −0−0.3147 (0.2404) −0.2979 (0.2589) −0.−0.3268 (−0.2440) −0.3142 (0.2522) 
AR 0.1795 (0.3165) −0.1833 (0.3303) −0.1900 (0.3246) −0.1974 (0.3257) 
CA 0.0216 (0.2978) 0.0148 (0.3111) 0.0008 (0.3087) 0.0020 (0.3116) 
DA 0.1424 (0.2927) 0.1350 (0.3038) 0.1225 (0.3059) 0.1195 (0.3079) 
DC 0.0091 (0.3210) 0.0142 (0.3302) −0.0116 (0.3305) −0.0142 (0.3314) 
DK −0.3123 (0.2381) −0.3127 (0.2510) −0.3142 (0.2470) −0.3278 (0.2431) 
ES −0.0815 (0.3254) −0.0654 (0.3462) −0.0577 (0.3428) −0.0671 (0.3452) 
EY −0.4625 (0.1228) −0.4813 (0.1137) −0.4729*** (0.1155) −0.4914*** (0.1000) 
GM −0.0675 (0.3044) 0.0366 (0.3177) −0.0554 (0.3149) −0.0551 (0.3170) 
HD −0.0694 (0.3077) −0.0443 (0.3204) −0.0777 (0.3172) −0.0514 (0.3201) 
HG 0.0587 (0.3322) 0.0634 (0.3464) 0.0530 (0.3440) 0.0527 (0.3480) 
HL −0.3423 (0.2309) −0.3347 (0.2459) −0.3565 (0.2334) −0.3441 (0.2420) 
MH .2822 (0.2434) 0.2961 (0.2423) 0.2712 (0.2546) 0.2902 (0.2450) 
NR −2.0e−15 (0.4050) 0.0496 (0.4369) −0.0267 (0.4136) 0.0163 (0.4306) 
Table 6. Estimated marginal effects of the probability of commercialization (robust standard 
errors in parentheses). 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NS −0.2379 (0.2698) −0.2451 (0.2782) −0.2474 (0.2747) −0.2573 (0.2738) 
RR −0.1162 (0.3047) −0.0968 (0.3205) −0.1145 (0.3148) −0.1017 (0.3195) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1928 0.1853 0.1881 0.1908 
Log pseudo-likelihood −226.53 −226.63 −227.89 −227.08 
N 405 405 405 9405 
Note: * = significant at the 0.01 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.10 level. 
With reference to the estimated marginal effects in column (1), projects that received additional 
developmental funding (AddFund =1) have a greater probability of success than projects that 
received no additional funding (AddFund =0). The estimated marginal effect on AddFund is 
positive and significant at the.01 level, and it indicates that additional funding correlates with a 
35 percentage point increase in the probability of commercialization. 
Likewise, as the log of the number of previous Phase II awards received by the business that are 
related to the current project (KnowlBase) increases, so does the probability of 
commercialization: the estimated marginal effect on lnKnowlBase is positive and significant at 
the.01 level. To provide perspective on this variable, notice that a 100% increase in levels (e.g. 
from 1 to 2) corresponds to an increase of 0.693 log points. Thus, a 100% increase in the 
knowledge base is predicted to raise the probability of commercialization by approximately 10 
percentage points (0.1413 × .693 = 0.098). 
Both these results support our a priori reasoning and are consistent with evidence from the 
descriptive analysis. 
Female (Female) and/or minority (Minority) owned and controlled businesses are not 
significantly more or less likely to commercialize from a Phase II project than are male and/or 
non-minority owned and controlled businesses. This suggests that the SBIR program's emphasis 
and funding priorities on female and minority owned and controlled businesses may be well-
focused in that female and minority owned and controlled businesses commercialize on par with 
businesses with other ownership profiles.35 
Conversely, university involvement (Univ =1) is positively related to the probability of 
commercialization; the estimated marginal effect is significant at the.05 level. University 
involvement increases the predicted probability of commercialization by 12 percentage points. 
Finally, as a group the Institute effects are statistically significant at the.01 level in this and all 
models estimated, with the highest rates of commercialization for projects funded by the 
National Institute of Mental Health (MH) and the lowest for those funded by the National Eye 
Institute (EY).36 
AddFunds is a binary variable quantifying additional developmental funding, from any source. 
The model underlying the results in column (2) disaggregates additional developmental funding 
into the five specific (although non-mutually exclusive) dichotomous categories. The presence of 
additional non-SBIR federal funds, US venture capital funds, and own funds are all positively 
related to the probability of commercialization. The estimated marginal effect of AddFund-Fed is 
positive and significant at the.05 level and indicates that the receipt of non-SBIR federal funds is 
correlated with a 29 percentage point increase in the probability of commercialization. The effect 
of AddFund-Own is positive and significant at the.01 level and is associated with a 28 
percentage point rise in the probability of commercialization. Venture capital support, AddFund-
VC, has a positive effect as well on the probability of commercialization, at the.05 level, and 
predicts a 26 percentage point higher commercialization probability. 
The models underlying columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 replace the disaggregated binary variables 
that denoted additional developmental funding, in columns (1) and (2), with the natural log of the 
dollar amount from each source. Natural logs rather than levels are used because preliminary 
estimates suggested diminishing returns to investment amounts.37 The significance pattern for 
these estimates is similar to that of corresponding specifications in columns (1) and (2) (that used 
dichotomous variables for corresponding categories of additional developmental funding), as are 
the conclusions to be drawn from the results.38 For instance, a 100% increase in the total amount 
of additional funding is predicted to increase commercialization probabilities by 1.9 percentage 
points. One difference, however, is these specifications suggest that given amounts of additional 
developmental funding from non-SBIR federal funds and, particularly, own and/or internal 
business sources, may have a stronger positive effect on commercialization probabilities than 
similar amounts of venture capital support, and that the greatest effect is associated with own 
and/or internal business funding (where there would logically be the greatest information about 
the potential success of the project). 
A summary of the marginal effects obtained from the probit models is useful to motivate a policy 
discussion in the last section of the paper. The probit estimates in column (4) of Table 6 imply 
that a 100% increase in developmental non-SBIR federal funding raises the predicted probability 
of commercialization by 1.5 percentage points; this probability similarly increases by 1.2 
percentage points with corresponding growth in venture capital funding, and by 1.8 percentage 
points with additional developmental funding from the owners or from the business itself.39 The 
probability of commercialization increases when the business’ knowledge base has been built 
through previous related Phase II research; it increases by 9.1 percentage points per 100% 
increase in the number of previous related Phase II awards. Female and minority owned and 
controlled businesses are equally as likely to commercialize as are other businesses. And, 
university involvement in Phase II award projects increase the probability of commercialization 
by 13 percentage points. 
As previously shown (in Table 5), many projects receiving additional funding obtain it from 
multiple sources, with frequent arrangements being some combination of personal or own 
company contributions combined with one of the four sources of funds. We explicitly allowed 
for this possibility in specifications (not reported) that interacted AddFund-Own with AddFund-
Fed, AddFund-VC, AddFund-Oth, and AddFund-SLU. Somewhat surprisingly, the first of these 
interactions was negative and significant at the.10 level, suggesting non-SBIR federal funding is 
strongly associated with commercialization probabilities when it is not accompanied by own 
company or personal contributions. This may reflect endogeneity in the federal funding process, 
an issue addressed in greater detail in the following section. None of the other three interaction 
coefficients approach statistical significance. 
5. Endogeneity issues 
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The preceding econometric models treat the receipt of additional funding as exogenous. If this is 
correct, then the results indicate causal effects of the various types of funding (and of the other 
explanatory variables) on commercialization probabilities. However, this is a strong assumption. 
For instance, potential funders may be more likely to provide support for projects with relatively 
favorable prospects for commercialization, and some of these might also be more likely to have 
commercialized even in the absence of additional funds. Both possibilities suggest that our 
estimates may overstate the extent to which additional funding will cause increases in 
commercialization for the average project. The relevance of potential endogeneity for assessing 
the SBIR program depends on the particular goals of policy-makers, and it is described in greater 
detail in the final section of the paper. 
We attempted to use instrumental variables techniques to examine potential endogeneity in the 
provision of non-SBIR federal funds, as well as from venture capital or other private sources. 
Not surprisingly, the principle difficulty was in obtaining good instruments – variables that 
strongly predict the receipt of additional funding without independently affecting 
commercialization probabilities. We instrumented for non-SBIR federal funding using the 
average amount of extramural award dollars provided, over the 1998–2006 period, by the NIH 
institute associated with the Phase II SBIR award.40 We then divided this average level of 
extramural funding by the number of Phase II SBIR awards in our data set and from the specified 
institute, so as to calculate a measure of funding availability per award.41 We also instrumented 
for funds from venture capital or other private sources using data from the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers/National Venture Capital Association MoneyTree Report 
(www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/index.jsp) on average venture capital activity for 19 
regions of the United States over the 1996-2006 period. The procedure used was to match the 
state in which the firm receiving the award was located to the relevant region and then to assign 
the average funding level and number of deals for the region (normalized by the number of 
associated surveyed SBIR projects) to that project.42 
Our efforts to use IV estimates to explicitly account for endogeneity were largely unsuccessful. 
The venture capital activity variables had essentially no predictive power in the first stage.43 
Conversely, the institute-specific level of NIH extramural award activity funding did strongly 
predict the first-stage probability of receiving non-SBIR federal funding. However, the IV point 
estimates of the effect of the latter on commercialization probabilities were almost identical to 
those obtained without instrumenting, while the associated standard errors increased 
dramatically. Therefore, while we did not uncover any evidence that our estimates were being 
seriously biased by endogeneity, our overall conclusion is that the issue remains potentially 
important and that future research will need to use creative approaches to examine its role. 
6. Discussion 
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The NRC data set is rich in a number of dimensions, not the least of which is that the information 
is at the level of a project rather than at the business level. However, before discussing possible 
policy implications of our findings, we offer several words of caution related to the data and the 
analysis performed. First, while the NRC data set does contain limited self-reported information 
on commercialization in dollar terms, the number of projects for which those data are available is 
small, with the result that our analysis is restricted to a dichotomous commercialization variable. 
From an assessment perspective, however, this constraint may be less detrimental than it at first 
appears since the stated objective of the SBIR program is commercialization per se. 
Second, we do not have information on when a project received additional developmental funds. 
Some projects may have received these monies during the Phase II research and others only after 
they attempt to or do commercialize an initial product/process/service. Or, additional 
developmental funding may have come in stages such as first obtaining non-SBIR federal funds 
and then obtaining venture capital funds. To offer some suggestive information on this question, 
we examined how the frequency of receipt of outside funds varied with the number of years 
since the Phase II award was granted. Our hypothesis is that if most outside funds were received 
after completion of the project as the research advanced towards commercialization, we would 
observe greater probabilities and larger amounts of additional funding for ‘older’ projects. There 
was no evidence of this, leading us to conclude that these funds are likely to be frequently 
provided during the project period and justifying our emphasis on the role of additional 
funding.44 That said, were we able to control for the timing of the additional developmental 
funds we might have been able to determine more precisely the relative importance of each 
source. For example, we could not investigate whether there was a ‘halo effect’ from additional 
non-SBIR federal support that subsequently increased the likelihood of the business obtaining 
venture capital funds (Toole and Turvey 2009).45 
Third, our analysis does not control for the nature of the underlying technology being researched 
and/or commercialized. While we did include Institute effects in our model, as a proxy for the 
character of the research, more detailed technology controls would be useful. One promising 
avenue for future research would be to make use of information from the original project 
proposal on the types of technologies focused upon and the expected method of 
commercialization, although it may be difficult to develop a satisfactory rubric for classifying 
technology alternatives. 
Caveats aside, several dimensions of our findings may have policy management relevance, and 
we offer piecemeal observations related to such issues, and then collectively we offer a 
numerical illustration of a specific recommendation. First, venture capital funding is positively 
related to the probability of commercialization. This is precisely the objective of Phase III. 
However, additional funding from the owner and/or business is much more common and has an 
equal or greater relative estimated impact on commercialization. Perhaps these results could be 
replicated in reality if Phase II awards were conditional on a commitment of matching internal 
funds.46 
Interestingly, this policy implication may be valid even if additional development funding is 
endogenously determined, as has been discussed and seems likely. Consider that there are at least 
two reasons why additional funding may be associated with higher rates of commercialization. 
First, the extra funds may permit activities that lead to successful commercialization and that 
would otherwise not take place. In this case, the non-SBIR money causally affects 
commercialization rates. Alternatively, the funds could be provided because the project has a 
high potential for commercialization. For instance, businesses are likely to be more willing to put 
their own resources into projects they view as having a high potential for commercialization. 
Notice, however, that conditioning Phase II awards on matching funds is likely to be desirable 
even in this second situation, since the government is essentially using the willingness to provide 
outside funds as a signal of the project's potential. 
Second, the NIH, and possibly other funding agencies, might consider incentives for Phase II 
award recipients to include university faculty and resources in research projects. A possible 
mechanism for doing so might be to award merit evaluation points during the Phase II award 
reviews for proposed university involvement, or to increase the funding amount for the same.47 
Of course, an obvious policy issue is whether increasing the dollar amount of Phase II awards 
will increase the probability of commercialization. Our theoretical arguments for the 
specification of Equation (1) did not include the size of the award and, more to the point, the 
NIH regularly exceeds the $750,000 guideline so a policy recommendation to increase the upper 
bound on Phase II awards would be moot.48 Empirically, as a descriptive observation, the award 
amount is not correlated with the probability of commercialization. 
Finally, we should emphasize that designing the SBIR award criteria so as to direct funds 
towards projects with the highest probabilities of commercialization does not necessarily 
increase the overall rate at which innovations are commercialized, since it is possible that 
sufficient private-sector support would have been obtained to commercialize these projects, even 
in the absence of the SBIR funds—in this case, the SBIR program is ‘crowding out’ private 
funds.49 Although we cannot definitively address this question, the available evidence suggests 
that the SBIR support is crucial for many of these projects. For instance, the NRC data set 
includes a question asking whether companies would have undertaken the projects in the absence 
of the SBIR award. The answer to this after-the-fact question was ‘definitely yes’ or ‘probably 
yes’ for less than 11% of the commercialized projects and ‘probably not’ or ‘definitely not’ for 
75%.50 Thus, SBIR support appears to be critical for most of the projects that ultimately 
commercialize. 
To combine aspects of the piecemeal observations above into a single policy simulation, consider 
the hypothetical numerical illustration in Table 7, which is based, mathematically, on the 
estimated probit equation underlying the results in column (4) of Table 6. As a base point of 
reference, consider a hypothetical Phase II project in a business that has no knowledge base, $0 
own and/or internal business additional developmental funding and no university involvement 
(and with all other covariates evaluated at the sample means). Under these hypothetical 
conditions, the calculated base probability that the Phase II project will commercialize a product, 
process, or service is 26%. 
Table 7. Probability of commercialization under alternative scenarios. 
Scenario Probit Index Estimated Probability of Commercialization (%) 
Baseline scenario 
  KnowlBase = 0 −0.649 25.8 
  $ AddFund-Own = $ 0     
  Univ = 0     
One previous related phase II SBIR 
  KnowlBase = 1 −0.420 33.7 
  $ AddFund-Own = $ 0     
  Univ = 0     
University involvement 
  KnowlBase = 0 −0.313 37.7 
  $AddFund-Own = $ 0     
  Univ = 1     
Average amount of own/internal funding 
  KnowlBase = 0     
Table 7. Probability of commercialization under alternative scenarios. 
Scenario Probit Index Estimated Probability of Commercialization (%) 
  $ AddFund-Own = $ 208,911 0.163 56.5 
  Univ = 0     
Average own/internal funding and university involvement 
  KnowlBase = 0 0.499 69.1 
  $ AddFund-Own = $208,911     
  Univ = 1     
All three 
  KnowlBase = 1     
  $ AddFund-Own = $ 208,911 0.729 76.7 
  Univ =1     
Note: Commercialization probabilities are obtained from the probit model estimated in column (4) of Table 5. The estimated 
equation for the index function is: Commercial = −0.3589 + 0.0529(ln$AddFund-Fed) + 0.0441(ln$AddFund-VC) + 0.0018 
(ln$AddFund-Oth) − 0.0212(ln $ AddFund-SLU) + 0.0663(ln $AddFund-Own) + 0.3308 (ln KnowlBase) + 0.0025(Female) + 
0.2943 (Minority) + 0.3359(Univ) + 0.0166(AA) − 0.6590(AG) − 0.8410(AI) − 0.5099(AR) + 0.0050(CA) + 0.3058(DA) - 
0.035(DC) − 0.9031(DK) − 0.1684(ES) − 1.8230(EY) − 0.1384(GM) − 0.1290(HD) + 0.1331(HG) − 0.9320(HL) + 0.8075(MH) 
+ 0.04086(NR) − 0.6760(NS) − 0.2563(RR) . 
 
Assume next that the business receiving the Phase II SBIR has a knowledge base corresponding 
to one previous related Phase II SBIR project (lnKnowlBase increases from 0 to 0.693). This 
raises the predicted probability of commercialization to 34%. The predicted commercialization 
probability rises by a similar amount – to 38% – when a university is involved in the research but 
the business has no knowledge base. The increase is much larger conditional on own and/or 
internal business funding at a level equal to the sample mean of $AddFund-Own ($208,911), but 
with no previous knowledge base or university involvement, in which case the expected 
commercialization rate is 57%. 
Thus, subject to the previously mentioned caveats, our results suggest that if the NIH is 
interested in managing its SBIR program so as to increase the probability of commercialization, 
it might wish to consider conditioning receipt of a Phase II award on university involvement and 
own and/or internal business funding. In this case, the commercialization probability is predicted 
to be 69%.51 Furthermore, for illustration purposes, and we are not suggesting this as a policy 
recommendation, Phase II awards were also conditioned on the receipt of at least one previous 
related award, so the probability of commercialization would increase even more, to 77%.52 
Additional research is certainly warranted to better understand the nature of commercialization 
from SBIR awards and to assess more completely that program objective. Hopefully, future 
research will overcome some of the data limitations of this study. Alternative research 
methodologies – such as a matched pairs analysis of small entrepreneurial businesses with and 
without SBIR support – might be useful for investigating both factors associated with the 
propensity to commercialize as well as the private and social implications from such 
commercialization. We also need to understand how the nature of the technology being 
researched affects commercialization probabilities, when, in the development process, additional 
funds are most needed to promote success of the projects, and whether the development process 
and the role of SBIR support differ for commercialized projects ultimately generating large 
versus small amounts of revenue. 
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Notes 
Real R&D performed in US industries had been decreasing since 1970, and not until 1977 did it 
return to its 1969 pre-decline level. A number of culprits have been identified as related to the 
US productivity slowdown. For a review of this literature, see Link and Siegel (2003). 
Public support for enhancing innovation in small firms can be traced to the 1960s (Turner and 
Brown 1999). 
Previous studies of NIH, or of an institute within NIH, include US Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) (2003); Audretsch, Aldridge, and Oettl (2006); and Toole and Czarnitzki 
(2007). None of these studies investigated within the context of an econometric model the 
determinants of the incidence of commercialization from SBIR-funded projects. 
This section draws on Link and Scott (2000); Audretsch, Link, and Scott (2002); National 
Research Council (2004); and Wessner (2000, 2007). For a taxonomy of public/private 
partnerships, see Link (1999, 2006). 
Since SBIR is a set aside program, it redirects existing R&D funds for competitive awards to 
small businesses rather than appropriating new monies for R&D. The 1982 Act allowed for this 
percentage to increase over time. 
As stated in the 1982 Act, to be eligible for an SBIR award, the small business must be (i) 
independently owned and operated; other than the dominant firms in the field in which they are 
proposing to carry out SBIR projects; (ii) organized and operated for profit; the employer of 500 
or fewer employees, including employees of subsidiaries and affiliates: the primary source of 
employment for the project's principal investigator at the time of award and during the period 
when the research is conducted; and (iv) at least 51% owned by US citizens or lawfully admitted 
permanent resident aliens. Our database does not cover projects funded under the related Small 
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program, which has similar aims but different eligibility 
requirements. 
‘The objective of Phase I is to determine the scientific or technical feasibility and commercial 
merit of the proposed research or R&D efforts and the quality of performance of the small 
business concern, prior to providing further Federal support in Phase II.’ See 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/SBIRContract/PHS2008-1.pdf, page 1. 
It is not uncommon, however, for NIH Phase II awards to exceed the $750,000 threshold. While 
NIH offers no research assessment-based justification, the NRC, as part of its evaluation of SBIR 
programs (discussed below), recommended that NIH formalize criteria for larger awards 
(Wessner forthcoming). See note 12. 
‘The objective of Phase II is to continue the research or R&D efforts initiated in Phase I. Funding 
shall be based on the results of Phase I and the scientific and technical merit and commercial 
potential of the Phase II proposal.’ See 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/SBIRContract/PHS2008-1.pdf, page 1. According to 
Wessner (forthcoming), in 2004 about 6% of Phase I applications were approved. Of those, just 
over one-third that requested Phase II funding were approved. 
‘The objective of Phase III, where appropriate, is for the small business concern to pursue with 
non-SBIR funds the commercialization objectives resulting from the outcomes of the research or 
R&D funded in Phases I and II.’ See 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/SBIRContract/PHS2008-1.pdf, page 1. 
The percentage increased to 1.5 in 1993 and 1994, 2.0 in 1995, and 2.5 in 1997. 
At the time of writing this paper, the SBIR/STTR Authorization Act was introduced in the US 
House of Representatives as H.R. 5819. It would, among other things, extend the SBIR program 
until 2010, increase agency set asides from 2.50% to 3.00%, and increase Phase I and Phase II 
funding limits to $300,000 and $2.2 million, respectively. 
This National Research Council initiative was mandated by the Small Business Reauthorization 
Act of 2000 (H.R. 5667). For background information on the Council's efforts, see National 
Research Council (2007) and Wessner (2007). The NRC, which graciously made these data 
available for this study, is also in the process of assessing the SBIR program in the Department 
of Defense, Department of Energy, NASA, and the National Science Foundation. See National 
Research Council (2004, 2007) for an overview of these agencies. 
The dataset and survey questionnaires are described completely in Cahill (2006). 
The National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research had only four funded projects with 
surveys returned, there was only a single project funded by the National Library of Medicine and 
no projects were funded by the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine. 
We tested robustness of the econometric results (below) to including observations with missing 
values for one or more covariates by placing a value of zero on these regressors and also 
controlling for a set of missing value dummy variables. The findings were not materially 
different than those presented below; these results are available from the authors on request 
We had no prior information about the percent of NIH SBIR projects that had been 
commercialized. The NIH's Phase I selection criteria focus, in part, on the significance of the 
project's commercialization potential: One criterion question is ‘Does the proposed project have 
commercial potential to lead to a marketable product, process or service?’ And, at the Phase II 
stage, there are additional related criteria, including’ ‘Did the applicant submit a concise 
Commercialization Plan?’ and ‘Does the project carry a high degree of commercial potential, as 
described in the Commercialization Plan?’ See 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/sbirsttr_ReviewCriteria.htm. 
Mansfield et al. (1971), for example, reported an average probability of commercial success from 
R&D projects in three laboratories (one chemical laboratory and two proprietary drug 
laboratories) of 31%. We caution the reader about comparing the probability of commercial 
success from this, or other similar case studies, with the probability of commercialization from 
NIH SBIR awards and concluding that businesses receiving NIH SBIR awards are more 
successful. The size and underlying research structure of the two groups of businesses is too 
different for meaningful comparisons. 
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the additional possibilities that (i) small 
businesses have greater difficulty obtaining external financing, so only the better projects are 
accepted; (ii) larger businesses, are on average more productive than smaller businesses so the 
latter have to play catch up within a market niche; and (iii) subsidies are generally granted to 
smaller businesses for short-term projects for which results are more easily observed. 
Link and Scott (2000) documented this fact through case studies of DoD SBIR awards. 
The overall knowledge base of the business is broader than measured by this variable; our 
emphasis is on complementary knowledge from previous awards. 
Link and Scott (2005) offered this same argument, and supported it empirically, with respect to 
various dimensions of success of small internal research projects conducted within the 
laboratories of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
Sampled projects of 2.7% are in businesses that were both female and minority owned and 
controlled. 
The survey question asks if (‘yes’ or ‘no’) there was any involvement by university faculty, 
graduate students, and/or university developed technologies. 
For a review of the literature related to universities as research partners, see Hall (2004). 
As examples of the project variation across Institutes, in 1997 the National Cancer Institute 
funded a California business to develop an image detector with 100 μ m spatial resolution 
applicable to the detection of cancer in small animals; in 1988 the National Heart, Lung, and 
Blood Institute funded a Virginia business to develop an optical imaging device to measure skin 
blood glow velocities for the treatment of vascular disease in diabetic patients; in 1999 the 
National Institute of Drug Abuse funded a New York business to develop an Internet-based 
dissemination plan for information and methods concerning drug abuse prevention approaches; 
and in 1994 the National Institute on Deafness and other Communication Disorders funded a 
Florida business to develop a hearing screener based on noise cancellation techniques to rapidly 
detect hearing problems in new-born infants. 
The NRC's (2007) data collection methodology implicitly assumed that recent Phase II awards 
will be completed and will have had sufficient time to commercialize within four years. 
Each additional year of age is predicted to reduce the probability of response by a statistically 
significant (at the.01 level) 1.12 percentage points. 
For example, the average ages of commercialized and non-commercialized projects were 7.3 and 
7.5 years, while the median age was 7.0 years for both. These results are available from the 
authors on request. 
These results are available from the authors on request. 
A table showing a complete set of sample means for commercialized and non-commercialized 
projects is available from the authors on request. 
These results are available from the authors on request. 
These three commercialized projects received $59.9, $50.1, and $20.0 million of venture capital 
funding. 
Skewness is also an issue for sources of external funds that are received more frequently. For 
example, although 63% of commercialized projects obtain personal or internal funding, the 
average amount ($273,421) is over nine times as large as the median ($30,000). 
If KnowlBase is redefined as the number of related Phase II projects, including the current one, 
there would be no (undefined) zero values. We obtained qualitatively similar results when 
controlling for the level rather than natural log of related previous Phase II projects. We also 
tested for diminishing returns by estimating specifications with controls for both linear and 
quadratic terms. The point estimates from these models suggest a concave relationship (with the 
commercialization probability predicted to reach a maximum at around 21 to 22 previous 
projects), consistent with the hypothesis of diminishing returns. 
However, this conclusion is tentative since we do not know whether there are race/ethnicity or 
gender differences in the quality of projects initially receiving SBIR funding. 
In an effort to also control for the ‘structural uncertainty’ of each project, in the context of Zeira 
(1987), we included dummy variables to account for how (i.e., in what non-mutually exclusive 
form) each project was commercialized (e.g., software, hardware, process technology, drug, 
biologic, research tool, etc.). Statistically, these dummies were not significant. 
For instance, a specification that included linear and quadratic terms for the total dollar amount 
invested suggested weakly diminishing returns, with a maximum commercialization probability 
at around $81 million dollars, which is equal to the maximum investment observed in our 
sample. The estimated marginal effects from a linear specification of the dollar amount of 
alternative funding sources reveal little, as was expected given the highly skewed distributions 
for these variables. 
Zero values for $AddFunds, $AddFunds-Fed, $AddFunds-VC, $AddFunds-Oth, $AddFunds-
SLU, and $AddFund-Own were reset to equal 1 so that the log of each would be defined. 
As above, the predicted effects of a 100% increase in explanatory variables expressed in natural 
logs are estimated by multiplying the marginal effect from the probit model by 0.693. 
These data were obtained from http://grants.nih.gov/grants/award/awardtr.htm. See Wallsten 
(2000) who used a similar technique. 
In performing this calculation, we used information on all awards surveyed, rather than just those 
with responses to it. 
Thus, there were two instruments, one indicating the normalized amount (in dollars) invested and 
the second denoting the (normalized) number of venture capital deals. Four of the regions were 
located within the state of California (LA/Orange County, Northeastern California, Silicon 
Valley and the San Diego areas). These were consolidated into a single region for the state of 
California. 
We estimated models where the first-stage dependent variable was all additional funding, 
additional funding from venture capital, or from either venture capital or other private sources. 
The instruments lacked predictive power in all of these cases. 
For example, additional funding was received more frequently and in larger amounts for projects 
surveyed four, five or six years after the award date than for those examined in later years. (The 
data set does not contain information on projects aged less than four years.) 
We did, however, examine whether the dollar amount of the SBIR award was related to the 
probability of receiving additional funding, thinking that award size might be viewed as a signal 
of the government's assessment of project potential. The data provide little support for this 
possibility. For instance, the average award of projects receiving outside funding was just 6% 
larger than for those that did not ($663,159 versus $627,186). 
A handful of states (e.g., North Carolina) have programs that match federal Phase I awards. The 
insignificance of the additional developmental funding from state or local government variable in 
our models might be a cautionary sign to bring about a rethinking of extending such programs to 
Phase II, assuming that one of the state's objectives in so doing would be to increase 
commercialization. If commercialization is a state objective, perhaps tying a matching grants 
program to university involvement is worth consideration. 
Our finding related to university involvement increasing the probability of commercialization 
has other possible implications. University technology transfer offices might broaden the scope 
of their mission to include assisting local and regional small entrepreneurial businesses during 
the Phase I and Phase II award process in anticipation of later involvement in the Phase II 
research and the possibility of sharing ownership with whatever is subsequently commercialized. 
Phase II awards were higher than $750,000 for just over 20% of our sample. 
There is a rich literature about the complementary versus substitutability between public R&D 
and private R&D. This so-called ‘crowding out’ literature traces to Blank and Stigler (1957), as 
reviewed by Leyden and Link (1992). David, Hall, and Toole (2000) have recently summarized 
the econometric literature on the subject and concluded that the empirical evidence to date is 
inconclusive, and more recent research (González and Pazó 2007, Görg and Strobl (2007), and 
Piekkola (2007) does not contradict the David, Hall, and Toole conclusions. 
The company was ‘uncertain’ for the remaining 14% of commercialized projects. It is not 
possible to provide the distribution of answers for noncommercialized projects (or for all 
projects) because this question was not asked for the majority of noncommercialized projects 
that had been ‘discontinued’ by the survey date. 
These estimates assume additive effects of university involvement and own company/personal 
funding on commercialization probabilities. A specification that also included the interaction of 
these two variables, suggests still larger increase in predicted commercialization rates (the 
interaction coefficient is positive). 
The SBIR program has made several institutional changes in recent years to increase the rate of 
commercialization. The Fast Track program permits businesses with projects of high 
commercialization success to submit the Phase I and Phase II applications for a concurrent 
review. Among other things, projects funded under Fast Track avoid the possibility of a funding 
gap between the completion of Phase I and the award/receipt of Phase II dollars. See Audretsch, 
Link, and Scott (2002) for an evaluation of the Fast Track program within the Department of 
Defense. According to Wessner (forthcoming), less than 6% of applicants current apply through 
the Fast Track Program. In 2002, NIH initiated their Commercialization Assistance Program 
(CAP) ‘ … to help some of the nation's most promising small life science and healthcare 
companies develop their commercial businesses and transition their SBIR-funded technologies 
into the marketplace’ through assistance with business development plans, marketing strategies, 
and formulating roadmaps for licensing. See http://www.larta.org/nihcap/NIHCAP-
ProgramDescription.pdf. 
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